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USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN SYRIA BY TURKEY,  
NATO, AND THE UNITED STATES 
JORDAN J. PAUST* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During an ongoing insurgency in Syria, Turkey has already 
used military force against Syrian military targets inside Syria.  
Was this use of force by Turkey permissible under international 
law?  If NATO engages in similar military force or more extensive 
armed force as a regional organization, will NATO’s conduct be 
permissible under international law?  U.S. military have been 
deployed to Jordan.  If the United States engages in the use of force 
in Syria under certain future scenarios, will such conduct be 
permissible under international law?  These and related questions 
are explored in the following essay. 
2. USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN SYRIA IN 2012 
2.1. Self-Defense Actions by Turkey 
On October 3, 2012, the Turkish town of Akcakale suffered 
artillery fire from armed forces of Syria.  The Syrian fire killed five 
civilians and injured nine other persons.  Turkey responded by 
firing on military targets in Syria, claiming self-defense against an 
“atrocious attack.”1  Turkey had contacted NATO, the Arab 
League, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the 
President of the U.N. Security Council, among others, prior to 
responding with military force.2 
Was the use of armed force by Syrian military personnel an 
armed attack that triggered the right of Turkey to use responsive 
force in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations 
                                                     
* Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston Law 
Center. 
1 See, e.g., Tim Arango & Anne Barnard, Turkey Strikes Back After Syrian 
Shelling Kills 5 Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
10/04/world/middleeast/syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
2 See, e.g., id. 
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Charter?  From my perspective, if Syria’s use of force was 
intentional, such a shelling constituted an armed attack that 
triggered a right to use proportionate responsive force.  Some 
claim that an attack must be of a certain gravity in order to 
constitute an armed attack,3 and some claim that a border incident 
does not constitute an armed attack.4  In contrast, I agree with the 
U.S. position that had been noted by Legal Adviser Harold Koh in 
September, 2012 during a speech on International Law in 
Cyberspace: 
                                                     
3 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27) (preferring a need “to distinguish the most 
grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other 
less grave forms”); Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6) 
(quoting Nicaragua, supra, ¶ 72); cf. id. ¶ 72 (“the mining of a single military vessel 
might be sufficient to bring into play the ‘inherent right of self-defense’”); JUDITH 
GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 143, 161 
(2004); Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 359, 
370 & nn.69, 71 (2009) (noting that a gravity threshold articulated in 1986 
“remained controversial”) (citing G. Dahm, Das Verbot der Gewaltanwendung nach 
Art. 2(4) der UNOCharta [The Prohibition on the Use of Force under Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter], 10 JAHRBUCH FÜR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 48, 54–56 (1961–1962); 
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 230–31 (4th ed. 2005); 
Norman Menachem Feder, Note, Reading the U.N. Charter Connotatively: Toward a 
New Definition of Armed Attack, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 395, 414–418 (1987); 
TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 133 (2005); and Randelzhofer, Art. 2(4) MN 36, in DIE CHARTA DER VEREINTEN 
NATIONEN: KOMMENTAR [THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY] 
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1991)).  See also, id. at 379-81 (noting new practice of 
states).  I agree with Dinstein, Kunz, Taft, and others who recognize the need to 
abandon an unrealistic gravity limitation.  See DINSTEIN, supra, at 195; J.L. Kunz, 
Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
41 AM. J. INT’L L. 872, 878 (1947); William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense and the Oil 
Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 300 (2004). 
4 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and 
Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 251 
& n.36 (2010).  In the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. used the phrase “mere frontier 
incident” as something in contrast to “the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed 
force against another State’” that, “because of its scale and effects, would have 
been classified as an armed attack.”  Nicaragua, supra note 3, ¶ 195.  There was no 
guidance concerning such a supposed distinction.  See also DINSTEIN, supra note 3, 
at 195 (arguing that “it would be fallacious to dismiss automatically from 
consideration as an armed attack every frontier incident,” such as when a soldier 
fires a single bullet across a border or a small military unit is attacked; and “‘even 
a small border incident’” can constitute an armed attack) (quoting J.L. Kunz, supra 
note 4); id. at 202 (cumulative “pin-prick” attacks can be viewed as a process of 
armed attack); id. at 230–31 (“[T]here is no cause to remove small-scale armed 
attacks form the spectrum of armed attacks.”). 
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the United States has for a long time taken the position that 
the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against 
any illegal use of force.  In our view, there is no threshold 
for a use of deadly force to qualify as an “armed attack”. . . . 
But that is not to say that any illegal force triggers the right 
to use any and all force in response—such responses must 
still be . . . proportionate.5 
William H. Taft, IV, a former Legal Adviser, had noted earlier 
that “[t]he gravity of an attack may affect the proper scope of the 
defensive use of force . . . but it is not relevant to determining 
whether there is a right of self-defense.”6  
In any event, cross-border artillery fire by Turkey has persisted 
in response to continued Syrian artillery and mortar shelling.7  
Such state-to-state uses of armed force have reached a sufficient 
gravity, do not constitute merely a border incident, and Turkey has 
a right to use proportionate responsive force as measures of self-
defense.  Additionally, the continued exchange between the Syrian 
and Turkish militaries has resulted in a limited international armed 
conflict to which the laws of war apply.8  For this reason, layered 
                                                     
5 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace, 
(Sept. 18, 2012) (transcript on file) available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/ 
releases/remarks/197924.htm (last visited, Nov. 27, 2012). 
6 Taft, supra note 3. 
7 See, e.g., Anne Barnard, Rebels Class with Syrian Security Forces Near Lebanon, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/ 
middleeast/rebels-clash-with-syrian-security-forces-near-lebanon.html 
(describing how the death of Turkish citizens due to a Syrian mortar shell led the 
Turkish government to establish a retaliation policy). 
8 It is the fact of war or armed conflict that triggers application of the laws of 
war, whether or not the parties have declared war or recognized that it exists.  See, 
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 7, ¶ 8(a)-(b) 
available at http://www.afsc.army.mil/gc/files/fm27-10.pdf (“(a) Types of 
Hostilities. . . . Instances of armed conflict without declaration of war may include . 
. . the exercise of armed force pursuant to a recommendation, decision, or call by 
the United Nations, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense against armed attack, or in the performance of enforcement measures 
through a regional arrangement, or otherwise, in conformity with appropriate 
provisions of the United Nations Charter.  (b) The customary law of war applies 
to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between 
the United States and other nations, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them.”); COMMENTARY IV, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 20 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) 
(“There is no need for a formal declaration of war, or recognition of the existence 
of a state of war . . . . The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.”); The Prize 
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1863) (holding that war can “exist de facto . . . . 
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laws regarding self-defense and the laws of war apply to permit 
and restrain the use of Turkey’s responsive armed force. 
Would Syria have had a right to use force in self-defense 
against military personnel from the Free Syrian Army located in 
Turkey who were directly participating in armed attacks against 
Syria and in the armed conflict in Syria?  Yes, if Syria had used 
selective force against members of the Free Syrian Army and had 
not attacked Turkish towns and Turkish military personnel.  States 
have a right to use proportionate measures of self-defense against 
non-state actors who engage in armed attacks from another state 
with or without the consent of the state from which the non-state 
actor armed attacks emanate9 and whether or not such a state is 
unwilling or unable to control its territory.10 
2.2. Collective Self-Defense by NATO 
On October 3rd, 2012, after the first Turkish response, the 
North Atlantic Council convened in an emergency meeting and 
condemned the Syrian attack as among “aggressive acts against an 
ally” and “flagrant violations of international law,”11 but the 
Council did not publicly declare an intent to participate in a 
responsive use of force.  Later, on October 9th and after Syrian and 
Turkish military units exchanged artillery and mortar barrages for 
the sixth straight day, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen 
announced that NATO was not anxious to get directly involved 
but will “protect and defend” Turkey under the North Atlantic 
Treaty “if necessary.”12  
                                                                                                                        
As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine . . . , its actual existence is a 
fact . . . .”).  Among layered laws, human rights law also applies in times of armed 
conflict and when measures of self-defense are employed during times of relative 
peace.  See, e.g., Paust, supra note 4, at 263-69. 
9 See, Paust, supra note 4, at 238-58 (reviewing the Caroline precedent and 
historical practice by the United States). 
10 See, e.g., id. at 249-258 (discussing the example of U.S. drone strikes against 
al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan); Jordan J. Paust, Permissible Self-Defense 
Targeting and the Death of bin Laden, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 569, 580-81 (2011) 
(using the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan to demonstrate 
that the willingness or ability of a state to control its territory does not limit the 
lawfulness of another state’s use of self-defense on that territory). 
11 Arango & Barnard, supra note 1. 
12 See, Anne Barnard & Christine Hauser, Group Tied to Al Qaeda Claims Attack 
on Compound Near Damascus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at A8. 
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Why is the North Atlantic Treaty relevant to NATO’s 
involvement?  Article 5 of the Treaty provides agreement in 
advance among the members of NATO:  
[A]n armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party 
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and 
in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.13 
In view of Article 5, it is evident that individual members of 
NATO can participate in collective self-defense at the request of a 
member-state14 that is under a process of armed attack and, 
moreover, that NATO could participate in collective self-defense. 
2.3. Regional Action by NATO 
A broader regional power concerning attacks that threaten 
regional peace and security also exists under the United Nations 
Charter for regional organizations such as NATO, the Organization 
of American States (“O.A.S.”), the African Union (“A.U.”, formerly 
Organization of African Unity or “O.A.U.”), and the League of 
Arab States.15  For example, Article 52 of the U.N. Charter 
recognizes the permissibility of actions taken by regional 
arrangements for “the maintenance of international peace and 
                                                     
13 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
14 In a sense, the North Atlantic Treaty provides consent in advance for 
collective self-defense.  Cf. Nicaragua, supra note 3, ¶ 195 (“[I]t is . . . clear that it is 
the State which is the victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the 
view that it has been so attacked.  There is no rule in customary international law 
permitting another State to exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis 
of its own assessment of the situation.”). 
15 See also 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 828 (Bruno 
Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHARTER COMMENTARY] (noting the O.A.S., 
O.A.U., and League of Arab States are among well-recognized regional 
arrangements or agencies dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security within the meaning of Article 52.  A prior 
distinction “between collective self-defence, seen as directed against an external 
aggressor, and collective security, viewed as measures taken against a member 
State of an organization, is no longer valid.  Such a distinction is found neither in 
Article 51 nor in Chapter VIII,” which contains Articles 52–53). 
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security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such . 
. . activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations.”16  Article 52 adds that “[n]othing in the . . . 
Charter precludes” regional arrangements for such “regional 
action.”17  Article 54 underscores the competence of regional 
organizations to engage in “activities undertaken . . . for the 
maintenance of international peace and security,” but requires that 
“[t]he Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed.”18 
2.3.1. Prior Regional Action by the O.A.S. 
During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union 
attempted to deliver nuclear weapons to Cuba, but the United 
States moved to interdict their transfer by deploying U.S. naval 
vessels to stop and search Soviet ships heading for Cuba.  The 
United States carefully avoided the term “blockade,” use of which 
would signal an act of war.19  On October 23, 1962, the O.A.S. 
General Assembly passed a resolution authorizing member states 
to participate in the interdiction.20  The United States held that the 
U.N. Charter envisioned this use of naval vessels as “collective 
measures” permitted under Article 52.  The then-Legal Adviser of 
the State Department noted that “[t]he President in his speech did 
not invoke Article 51 or the right of self-defense.  And the O.A.S. 
acted not under Article 3 [of the Rio Treaty], covering cases of 
armed attack, but under Article 6, covering threats to the peace 
other than armed attack.”21 
                                                     
16 U.N. Charter art. 52(1).  Purposes of the Charter include the need to serve 
peace, security, self-determination of peoples, and human rights.  See, e.g., id. 
pmbl., arts. 1, 55, 56.  Such purposes also limit the authority of the Security 
Council.  See, e.g., id. arts. 24(2), 25. 
17 Id. art. 52(1). 
18 Id. art. 54. 
19 See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES 
AND THE ROLE OF LAW (1974) (detailing the U.S. government’s cautious analysis of 
international law during its internal discussions about how to characterize the 
country’s actions toward Cuba); MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE 397 (2d ed. 2009). 
20 See Resolution of the Council of the Organization of American States, 
Meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation, Oct. 23, 1962, available at 47 U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 723 (1962) (calling for the “immediate dismantling and 
withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive 
capability.”).  
21 Abram Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action in Cuba, 47 DEP’T STATE BULL. 
763, 764 (1962).  See also CHAYES, supra note 19, at 554 (asserting that no claim of 
Article 51 self-defense was made); CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 845 
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2.3.2. Prior Regional Action by NATO in Kosovo. 
NATO is a regional arrangement designed partly for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  Although too 
many seem not to realize it, NATO’s actions in Kosovo in 1999 
exemplify regional peace and security actions permitted by Article 
52 of the U.N. Charter, especially since they promoted peace, 
security, self-determination, and human rights in the area.22   Such 
regional competence is partly enhanced by Charter-based duties of 
every state to take joint and separate action for the universal 
respect for and observance of human rights.23  
Article 53 of the U.N. Charter does not limit “regional action” 
permitted in Article 52 (and, as noted, Article 52 states that nothing 
in the Charter precludes regional arrangements for such action).  
But Article 53 does prohibit regional organizations from engaging 
in “enforcement action” that is actually “under the authority” of 
the Security Council “without the authorization of the Security 
Council.”24  In some instances, the Security Council has made 
decisions to authorize use of regional organizations as part of 
enforcement action that the Security Council has authorized and 
might control,25 and there might be a growing use of regional 
organizations in this manner in the future. 
                                                                                                                        
(arguing that O.A.S. authorized members could take “all, including military, 
measures” to interdict the transfer of Soviet nuclear weapons); O’CONNELL, supra 
note 19, at 397–405; Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 515, 523–24 (1963) (defending the interdiction as regional action 
permissible under Article 52); The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, in 4 MARJORIE M. 
WHITEMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF INT’L L. 523 (1965). 
22 Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 545–47 (2002).  But see Shinya Murase, The 
Relationship Between the UN Charter and General International Law Regarding Non-
Use of Force: The Case of NATO’s Air Campaign in the Kosovo Crisis of 1999, in 2 LIBER 
AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1543, 1544–45, 1551-52 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 
2002); infra note 28 and accompanying text.  NATO’s website identifies “collective 
defense, crisis management and cooperative security” as being among its “core” 
strategic purposes in a “transformed security environment.”  See Strategic 
Concepts, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/topics_56626.htm?selectedLocale=en (last updated May 30, 2012). 
23 See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 55(c), 56. 
24 Id. art. 53, para. 1. 
25 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, ¶¶ 5, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999), U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (authorizing “Member States and relevant 
international organizations” to use force in Kosovo); CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra 
note 15, at 827, 848, 859–62. 
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Nonetheless, permissible regional organization actions are not 
always “enforcement action” “under the authority of” the Security 
Council.  For example, when the Security Council is veto-
deadlocked with respect to its ability to make “decisions” to 
authorize “enforcement action,” permissible regional military 
actions under Article 52 are neither “enforcement action” nor 
“under the authority of” the Security Council, at least until the 
Council can act and actually decide on measures under Chapter 
VII of the Charter.  When the Council is veto-deadlocked, it is 
unable to decide on measures “to give effect to its decisions”26 or to 
decide on “action required to carry out” its decisions,27 and it is 
unable to decide to “utilize” a regional arrangement “for 
enforcement action under its authority” within the meaning of 
Article 53.  In view of the above, it is evident that NATO’s actions 
in Kosovo were permissible under Article 52 and were not 
impermissible under Article 53 of the Charter.28   
By majority vote, the Security Council should also be able to 
provide “authorization” for regional action even though, or 
especially because, such action is not “enforcement action” “under 
the authority of” the Council.  This impliedly occurred in March, 
1999 when the Security Council voted to defeat a draft resolution 
                                                     
26 See U.N. Charter arts. 41–42. When the Security Council is veto-
deadlocked, despite a statement in a prior resolution that it decides to “remain 
seized” of a matter, realities such as those in Kosovo and now in Syria 
demonstrate that it is seized of nothing in a controlling sense, and that, for tens of 
thousands of victims of ongoing violence, its claim can function as cruel nonsense.  
Certainly the fact that the Security Council prefers to remain seized in its attention 
does not preclude other entities from exercising their competencies under the 
Charter, such as those of the International Court of Justice, the U.N. Secretary-
General, the U.N. General Assembly, and regional organizations. 
27 Id. art. 48. 
28 See Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: 
Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1772–75 (2000) (contending that 
intervention was, indeed, legal); cf. DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 310–14 (missing the 
point that Article 52 provides for “regional action” when the Security Council is 
unable to act and to authorize “enforcement action” as such).  See also CHRISTINE 
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 161–62 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining 
that the Cuban missile crisis was authorized as “regional peacekeeping under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”).  But see id. at 49–50 (claiming that NATO 
authorization regarding Kosovo without Security Council authorization was 
supposedly of “doubtful” validity); CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 868–
69.  For further analysis, compare editorial comments of Professors Henkin, 
Wedgwood, Chinkin, Falk, Franck, Reisman in Christine Chinkin et al., Editorial 
Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824 (1999), with Jonathan 
I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1231 (1999) (revised from 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834 (1999)). 
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attempting to restrain NATO’s authority in Kosovo.29  Later, in 
June, 1999, the Security Council authorized “States and relevant 
international organizations” to establish a security presence in 
Kosovo,30 and part of the Security Council’s authorization had 
recognized that “the international security presence with 
substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must 
be deployed under unified command and control.”31  By doing so, 
the Security Council impliedly ratified NATO’s prior conduct and 
its presence in Kosovo.  Over time, such implied and ratifying 
authorizations can supplement new patterns of normative 
expectations and “subsequent practice” and, therefore, provide 
either a new or clarified meaning concerning provisions of the 
U.N. Charter noted herein.32   
Additionally, the fact that NATO is the only regional 
organization that has three permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council among its twenty-eight members and that 
decisions of the North Atlantic Council (where each member has a 
vote) must be unanimous might supplement NATO’s perceived 
authority in the international community.  NATO’s increased 
                                                     
29 See Belarus, India, and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. 
S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999) (vote: 12-3 (Namibia, People’s Republic of China, 
Russia)); Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 
830–31 (1999).  But see Monica Hakimi, To Condone or Condemn? Regional 
Enforcement Actions in the Absence of Security Council Authorization, 40 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 643, 676 (2007) (missing the legal relevance of regional action under 
Article 52 of the Charter and noting that “the scale of . . . defeat [of the draft 
resolution] was politically significant, for it meant that the international 
community was overwhelmingly unwilling to condemn NATO for taking an 
enforcement action outside the parameters of the U.N. Charter”); Murase, supra 
note 22, at 1544–45 (cf. id. at 1551-52); Sreenivasa Rao Pemmaraju, International 
Organizations and Use of Force, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA, supra note 
22, at 1599–1600, 1602. 
30 See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 25, ¶ 5 (“Decides on the deployment in 
Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security 
presences . . . .”); id. ¶ 7 (“Authorizes Member States and relevant international 
organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out 
in point 4 of annex 2”). 
31 See id., Annex 2, ¶ 4.  See also CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 868. 
32 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (concerning the fact that new patterns of practice and 
opinio juris can change the meaning of treaty provisions). See also Hakimi, supra 
note 29, at 676 n.190 (noting that the Slovenian representative at the U.N. in March 
1999 had referred to “‘the practice of the Security Council, which has several 
times, including on recent occasions, chosen to remain silent at a time of military 
action by a regional organization aimed at the removal of a regional threat to 
peace and security’”). 
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membership and involvement in matters affecting regional peace 
and security are part of a new reality that should be considered 
with respect to the various objects and purposes of the U.N. 
Charter and interpretation of its provisions.33   
3. DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS IN JORDAN 
3.1. Future Elimination of Chemical and Biological Weapons in 
Syria 
On October 10, 2012, it was reported that the United States has 
a task force of more than 150 military personnel in Jordan to help 
with the flood of Syrian refugees, to “prepare for the possibility 
that Syria will lose control of its chemical [and biological] 
weapons,” and to prepare to aid Jordan in avoiding cross-border 
clashes with Syrian military forces.34 
If U.S. military forces destroy chemical and biological weapons 
stashed in Syria in order to assure that they do not fall into the 
hands of al Qaeda or other nefarious groups, would the U.S. use of 
military force be permissible under the United Nations Charter?  
Would it constitute what most consider to be an unlawful 
                                                     
33 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 32, art. 31(1) 
(concerning the fact that serving the objects and purposes of a treaty are relevant 
to the meaning of treaty provisions).  See also supra note 16 (regarding purposes of 
the U.N. Charter).  NATO is aware of a new reality connected to a transformed 
security environment.  See supra note 22. 
34 See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon & Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. Military Is Sent to 
Jordan to Help With Crisis in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/world/middleeast/us-military-sent-to-
jordan-on-syria-crisis.html; Spec Ops Troops Set Up Near Syrian Border to Help 
Jordan, AIR FORCE TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, at 13 (“about 150 troops, mainly Army 
Special Forces, have deployed” in Jordan, “lawlessness in Syria has fueled 
concerns that . . . [chemical and biological] weapons could fall into the hands of 
Islamic militants,” and it is “unclear what role al-Qaida-linked militants may be 
playing in the Free Syrian Army”).  See also Syrian Rebels Overrun Missile Base, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2012, at 9 (“Syria is believed to have one of the world’s largest 
chemical weapons programs . . . . Western powers . . . worry that Islamist 
extremists are playing an increasing role in the conflict” and there is fear that 
chemical and biological weapons could fall into their hands); Craig Whitlock, U.S. 
Steps Up Support of Turkey Amid Syrian Conflict, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2012/10/19/ 
98b4f104-1a1e-11e2-b235-9cd54b35db6f_story.html (military officials from the 
United States and Turkey “have met to make contingency plans to impose no-fly 
zones over Syrian territory or seize Syria’s stockpiles of chemical and biological 
weapons” and “cross-border shelling has continued,” adding that “[t]he Obama 
administration . . . [is] monitoring the whereabouts of Syria’s stockpiles of” 
chemical and biological weapons). 
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“preemptive”35 use of armed force?  Could it constitute a lawful 
measure of collective self-defense at the request of Jordan and/or 
Turkey? 
Turkey is under a process of armed attacks by Syrian military 
units and could request assistance from the United States, but 
would al Qaeda fighters who are aiding the Free Syrian Army and 
obtain possession of the weapons be likely to use them against 
Turkey?  If Jordan is under a similar process of armed attacks by 
Syrian military units, could Jordan request assistance to destroy 
chemical and biological weapons in Syria once they are in control 
of al Qaeda fighters or their affiliates?  It is likely that Jordan 
would merely have a claim similar to that of Turkey.  Yet, given 
the fact that a limited armed conflict exists between Turkey and 
Syria, the law of war paradigm is applicable in addition to the self-
defense or collective self-defense paradigm, and layered laws 
apply.   
Under the laws of war, Turkey presently has authority to 
destroy lawful military targets such as chemical and biological 
weapons located in Syria and under control of the Assad regime.36  
If an armed conflict exists between Syria and Jordan, Jordan will 
also have such a competence under the laws of war.  If Turkey or 
Jordan request assistance from the United States or NATO to 
destroy military targets in Syria during an armed conflict, the 
United States or NATO could participate but would become 
participants in an armed conflict with Syria or the remnants of the 
Assad regime.  For the United States or NATO, the war could be 
very short, involving merely selective use of force to destroy 
chemical and biological weapons and any defensive force needed 
to support such a mission. 
If, in the future, Syrian chemical or biological weapons are 
actually controlled by members of al Qaeda, in view of the fact that 
al Qaeda engages in continued armed attacks on U.S. military 
                                                     
35 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 22, at 533-38 (noting a difference between mere 
“preemptive” use of force, which is widely known to be unlawful, and 
“anticipatory” use of force in self or collective self-defense when an armed attack 
is imminent). 
36 See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), art. 52(2) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (8 June 1977) (“Attacks shall be limited 
strictly to military objectives . . . . [M]ilitary objectives are limited to those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in 
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”).  
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personnel and other U.S. nationals, the United States could claim 
the right to target members of al Qaeda in Syria who directly 
participate in such a process of armed attacks as well as the 
weapons that they control as a measure of self-defense under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.37  In such a circumstance, the United 
States could also request the aid of Jordan, Turkey, and NATO 
with respect to lawful measures of collective self-defense.  The self-
defense paradigm pertains whether or not targetings are also 
permissible under the laws of war in an actual theatre of war, such 
as exists in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan.  In my opinion, 
under international law the United States cannot be at war or in an 
armed conflict with al Qaeda as such.38  Therefore, the law of war 
paradigm does not aid the United States in its efforts to target 
members of al Qaeda and their weapons in Syria absent an armed 
conflict between the United States and Syria in which members of 
al Qaeda participate in fighting against armed forces of the United 
States. 
In any event, it would be more clearly legally appropriate for 
NATO to authorize the destruction of chemical and biological 
weapons in Syria as an Article 52 regional action that is needed to 
end a manifest threat to regional peace and security that can arise 
once such dangerous weapons are likely to fall into the hands of 
unsavory non-state actors.  With such an authorization, either a 
U.S. or NATO force could destroy the weapons.  Under the U.S. 
Constitution, it would be far more lawful for the President to use 
military force in self-defense or collective self-defense under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or to participate in NATO- or 
Security Council-authorized uses of force,39 as opposed to merely 
entering the limited war between Turkey and Syria without a 
treaty-based competence or authorization.  
One can understand that a terroristic release of certain biologic 
agents could cause the deaths of millions in a region and might 
                                                     
37 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 4, at 260-64, 270-72 (concerning the propriety of 
U.S. measures of self-defense against members of al Qaeda located in a foreign 
country and who directly participate in armed attacks, and who are, therefore, 
targetable as direct participants in armed attacks (DPAA)); Paust, Permissible Self-
Defense Targeting, supra note 10, at 571-72, 575-76. 
38 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 4, at 260 & n.53; Jordan J. Paust, Propriety of Self-
Defense Targetings of Members of al Qaeda and Applicable Principles of Distinction and 
Proportionality, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 565, 566-72 (2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2165278. 
39 See Jordan J. Paust, Constitutionality of U.S. Participation in the United 
Nations-Authorized War in Libya, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 47-55, 66-67 (2012). 
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threaten all of humankind if, for example, there are inadequate or 
no known means of preventing their spread and deadly 
consequences.  Waiting for a veto-deadlocked Security Council to 
authorize enforcement action in such a circumstance would not be 
rational or policy-serving, especially when a regional organization 
could take action that has become necessary in order to avert a 
regional or global biologic catastrophe.  When a regional 
organization engages in regional action to assure the destruction of 
biologic agents, effort should be made to incinerate the agents with 
heat so intense that their escape into the environment is not 
possible.  During times of relative peace, because such deadly 
agents might exist in several countries, preventative efforts should 
be made to destroy biologic agents with the cooperation of the 
states possessing them.  Where the agents have not been destroyed, 
effort should be made to identify their location so that during times 
of local armed conflict, for example, regional organizations might 
be able to destroy them before they are used by terrorist groups. 
3.2. Future U.S. Support of a Legitimate Government of the Syrian 
People 
The future is uncertain, but if the armed conflict in Syria 
continues, with the outside recognition of a governmental entity as 
the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, how might such 
a development condition the legitimacy of outside use of military 
force in Syria? 
During the conflict in Libya in 2011, there was a change in the 
international legal status of the Libyan rebel-insurgents to 
belligerents, and “they consented to and welcomed” the use of 
armed force by the United States and NATO to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas.40 
                                                     
40 Jordan J. Paust, International Law, Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring, 
46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Paust, The Arab Spring] 
(manuscript on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1991432.  
See also Paust, supra note 39, at 44–45 (describing Operation Odyssey Dawn, 
conducted in Libya in 2011); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Department 
of State, Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya (Mar. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm (“U.S. forces have 
targeted the Qaddafi regime’s air defense systems, command and control 
structures, and other capabilities of Qaddafi’s armed forces used to attack 
civilians and civilian populated areas.”).  The U.N. Security Council had expressly 
authorized “Member States . . . to take all necessary measures . . . to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in” Libya.  See S.C. 
Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).  Cf. Paust, The Arab Spring, 
supra (“Over a period of months, it had become reasonably necessary to provide 
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In July 2011, the National Transitional Council of Libya 
(“NTC”) gained recognition as the legitimate representative of the 
Libyan people,41 and its consent provided additional independent 
legitimacy for use of force to support regime change, to provide 
self-determination assistance to the Libyan people, and to 
participate in collective self-defense42 against continuous armed 
                                                                                                                        
support for regime change in Libya in order to effectively protect civilians who 
were under a series of murderous armed attacks and serious threats of imminent 
future attacks by the Qaddafi regime.”).  The General in command of NATO’s air 
operation in Libya has noted that selective use of force by NATO involved 
continual protection of civilians and civilian populated areas from armed attacks 
by pro-Qaddafi forces (PGF) but that anti-Qaddafi forces (AGF) were not attacked 
because “[w]e saw when the [AGF] entered towns, they liberated the town and 
the people.  They did not indiscriminately attack civilians and in fact, kept the 
civilians away from any of the fighting between the AGF and PGF.”  See E-mail 
from Lieutenant General Ralph J. Jodice II, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, to 
author (Apr. 20, 2012, 09:50 CST) (on file with author). 
41 See, e.g., Fourth Meeting of the Libya Contact Group Chair’s Statement, July 15, 
2011, Istanbul, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ¶ 4 (July 15, 
2011), available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/fourth-meeting-of-the-libya-contact-
group-chair_s-statement_-15-july-2011_-istanbul.en.mfa (concerning recognition 
in July 2011 by thirty-two countries (including the United States) that the NTC 
became “the legitimate governing authority in Libya”).  See also Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 775, 779–
80 (John R. Crook ed., 2011) (describing U.S. Department of State officials’ 
remarks on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recognition of the NTC during a 
meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul in mid-July 2011); William Wan & 
William Booth, United States Recognizes Libyan Rebels as Legitimate Government, 
WASH. POST, Jul. 15, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-
east/western-arab-leaders-meet-in-turkey-on-libyas-future/2011/07/15/ 
gIQAZLbjFI_story.html (noting the “full diplomatic recognition” given to the 
Libyan rebels); Stefan Talmon, Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional 
Council, ASIL INSIGHTS, June 16, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.asil.org/ 
pdfs/insights/insight110616.pdf (exploring the meaning and scope of the 
recognition).  With respect to recognition of the NTC and Security Council 
encouragement of the NTC (or “the Libyan authorities”) to implement its plans, 
for example, to “protect Libya’s population,” restore governmental services, 
prevent violations of human rights, and ensure an inclusive political process 
involving free elections, see, for example, S.C. Res. 2009, ¶¶ 5, 7, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011). 
42 See Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due 
Process: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 11–12 n.39 (1978) 
(“Contextual reality and the serving of all goal values require a new reading of 
article 51 of the Charter” where a given people are denied self-determination by 
an oppressive elite using military force, “especially in the light of massive 
violations of human rights of their people[].  Outside states cannot precipitate 
violence, but where an armed attack has occurred against a people seeking self-
determination it is not improper to assist those being attacked.”).  Recognition of 
the right of self-defense and collective self-defense of a people entitled to self-
determination who are under armed attack is all the more appropriate given the 
fact that such peoples are among recognized non-state actors with formal 
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attacks by remnants of the Qaddafi regime.  Prior to the 
authorization of use of military force in Libya by the Security 
Council, the League of Arab States had also supported creation of a 
no-fly zone in Libya.43  It is theoretically possible that the Security 
Council or the League of Arab States will respond similarly with 
respect to the need to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
in Syria, but there have been no such authorizations.  What if in the 
future they do not occur? 
One possible scenario could involve the outside recognition of 
a governmental entity as the legitimate representative of the Syrian 
people44 and that entity’s consent to or request for outside military 
                                                                                                                        
participatory roles in the international legal process and that international law 
and international relations have never been merely state-to-state.  With respect to 
documentation of these facts, see, for example, Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor 
Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 
978–81, 1000 (2011) (listing examples of nations, tribes, indigenous peoples, and 
“belligerents” that have formally participated in international legal processes).  
International relations also recognizably exist once a status of belligerency is 
obtained and, at such a moment at least, all of the customary laws of war are 
applicable.  Id. at 981 (citing, for example, the Confederate States of America 
during the U.S. Civil War). 
43 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 40, pmbl. (“Taking note also of the 
decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for 
the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe 
areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure . . . .”); Steven 
Erlanger, Sarkozy Puts France at Vanguard of West’s War Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/europe/21france.html 
(citing Arab League criticism of mission-creep of forces implementing the no-fly 
zone); Julian Borger, The Libyan Crisis: Obama’s Dilemma Over a No-Fly Zone, JULIAN 
BORGER’S GLOBAL SECURITY BLOG, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2011, 8:02 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2011/ 
mar/13/libya-nato (noting the Arab League’s vote in favor a no-fly zone bringing 
“military intervention closer to reality.”); White House Welcomes Arab League Libya 
No-Fly Zone Call, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 12, 2011, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/arab_league_libya/2336021.html (reporting a 
White House statement in support of the Arab League call for a no-fly zone). 
44 Turkey, France, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Qatar, Kuwait, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other states have 
already recognized the Syrian coalition as the legitimate leader of the Syrian 
people.  See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu & Tim Arango, Turks Grant Recognition to Coalition 
of Syrians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/ 
world/middleeast/turkey-recognizes-new-syrian-rebel-group-as-legitimate-
leader-of-syria.html; Steven Erlanger & Rick Gladstone, France Grants Its 
Recognition to Syria Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/11/14/world/middleeast/syria-war-developments.html?pagewanted=all; 
Neil MacFarquhar & Hania Mourtada, Citing a ‘Credible Alternative’ to Assad, 
Britain Recognizes Syrian Rebel Group, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/world/middleeast/britain-is-latest-
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support for self-determination assistance45 and/or collective self-
defense against continual armed attacks on Syrian people by the 
Assad government.46  A legitimate Syrian governmental entity 
could request assistance from Turkey, Jordan, the United States, 
the League of Arab States, and/or NATO.  For the people of Syria, 
such a scenario is long overdue. 
 
                                                                                                                        
power-to-recognize-syrian-opposition-coalition.html?_r=0; Mark Landler et al., 
U.S. Will Grant Recognition to Syrian Rebels, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/middleeast/united-states-
involvement-in-syria.html?pagewanted=all&amp;_r=0. 
45 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 22, at 547–48 (describing the permissibility of 
self-determination assistance under the U.N. Charter); Paust, The Arab Spring, 
supra note 40, at 31–38 (discussing self-determination assistance and its legal 
support in the context of regime change in Libya during 2011). 
46 See supra note 41 (listing various countries’ recognition of the NTC as the 
legitimate government of Libya in 2011). 
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